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ABSTRACT 
A cultural debate exists to determine if the MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff 
and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) should be operated by 
rated pilots, commissioned officers, or enlisted personnel.  Each military service 
has historically treated this issue differently. The U.S. Navy currently requires 
rated pilots to fly Fire Scout, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps allow enlisted 
personnel to fly their Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), and the Air Force 
only allows rated pilots to fly their UAV systems.  Technology has advanced 
rapidly in the area of UAVs as they have advanced from being remotely piloted 
aircraft to now being completely autonomous.  This research examined the Air 
Vehicle Operator (AVO) requirements for autonomous vehicles such as Fire 
Scout and will demonstrate that the U.S Navy should create a pilot program that 
trains enlisted personnel to operate Fire Scout.  
This research identifies the costs and benefits associated with each type 
of prospective operator alternative—rated pilots, commissioned Surface Warfare 
Officers (SWO), and Operations Specialist (OS) enlisted personnel. By utilizing 
enlisted AVOs vice rated pilots, training costs will be found to be reduced from 
millions to tens of thousands, annual amortized manning costs will be cut by 
more than half, and total cost savings will be found to be on the order of a billion 
dollars over a ten-year period.  The research will also identify both tangible and 
intangible benefits by allowing enlisted personnel to become Fire Scout AVOs.  
Benefits are identified relating to training time, manning constraints, physiological 
constraints, culture, and safety.  Furthermore, this research will summarize 
current Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA) necessary to operate an 
autonomous air vehicle such as Fire Scout.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to determine air vehicle operator (AVO) 
requirements for operating Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV).  The goal is to examine Fire Scout AVO 
alternatives among rated pilots, commissioned officers, and enlisted sailors.  In 
particular, the analysis will focus on the costs and benefits associated with each 
AVO alternative as well as the required capabilities of the operator.  Background 
research will analyze the specifications and capabilities of Fire Scout as well as 
its military employment to date.  This paper will also examine how the various 
armed services have determined their AVO requirements.  For example, the 
Army and Marine Corps use enlisted operators for their small unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) operations, but the Air Force uses rated pilots for their larger, more 
complex UAV systems.  The Navy has allowed enlisted personnel operate their 
smaller RQ-2 Pioneer and RQ-7 Shadow UAVs, but has utilized rated pilots to 
operate Fire Scout.    
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Questions 
• Who should operate the Fire Scout VTUAV—rated pilots, 
commissioned Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), or enlisted 
Operations Specialist (OS) personnel?  
• What are the costs and benefits associated with each type of 
operator alternative? 
2. Secondary Question 
• What are the requisite Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) 
for a Fire Scout air vehicle operator (AVO)? 
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C. DISCUSSION 
UAV technology has advanced rapidly in recent years.  Air vehicles have 
advanced from being remotely piloted aircraft to now being completely 
autonomous. A remotely piloted vehicle is one that has flight control surfaces 
manipulated by an operator from a remote location such as a ground control 
station (GCS).  The operator actually flies the aircraft by manipulating traditional 
flight control surfaces.  An autonomous vehicle is one that has flight control 
surfaces manipulated automatically by computer software—the operator merely 
tells the aircraft where to go and it does so on its own.  These two systems are 
inherently very different.  The Fire Scout VTUAV is an autonomous vehicle, not a 
remotely piloted vehicle.  Fire Scout can takeoff, land, and fly a preprogrammed 
flight path automatically as set by the AVO.  If the aircraft loses contact with the 
GCS, it will orbit as it attempts to regain communications and will fly to a pre-
selected landing site if unable to do so.  All flight control surfaces are moved 
automatically with no input from the AVO.  It simply does what it is told to do—
automatically. 
The debate exists to determine who should fly these aircraft.  Since the 
birth of Naval Aviation, the Navy has trained commissioned officers to become 
rated pilots to fly manned aircraft.  For the Navy, a rated pilot is an individual that 
has completed all formal aviation training requirements as set forth by the Chief 
of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) and is subsequently designated as a Naval 
Aviator.  In keeping with that tradition, the Navy has thus far chosen to employ 
commissioned officer rated pilots to fly VTUAVs.  But is this really necessary?  
The Navy has already proven that enlisted operators can successfully operate 
the RQ-2 Pioneer and RQ-7 Shadow, the Army uses enlisted soldiers to fly 
various UAVs, and the Marine Corps also uses enlisted soldiers to fly the RQ-7 
Shadow.  Granted, these fixed-wing UAVs are much smaller than a Fire Scout 
VTUAV, but they are not autonomous like the Fire Scout—they are remotely 
piloted UAVs.  The Fire Scout VTUAV is completely autonomous. So why is the 
Navy spending vast amounts of money to train a commissioned officer to 
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become a rated pilot just to fly an autonomous vehicle that can takeoff, land, and 
fly all by itself?  Rated pilots spend years in training earning their wings and 
becoming qualified in operational fleet aircraft.  The manufacturer of Fire Scout, 
Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC), has proven that they can train AVOs for 
a fraction of the cost. The Navy has even created Navy Enlisted Classifications 
(NEC) for air vehicle operators (AVO) as well as for mission payload operators 
(MPO).  Yet why does the Navy continue to employ rated pilots as Fire Scout 
AVOs?   
This research will focus on identifying the costs and benefits associated 
with each type of prospective operator alternative.  The research will compare 
rated pilots, commissioned Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), and Operations 
Specialist (OS) enlisted personnel.  Furthermore, this research will summarize 
the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) necessary to operate an autonomous 
vehicle such as Fire Scout, as determined by the U.S. military. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study will provide the Navy with a Cost Benefit Analysis of various 
types of Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) alternatives.  Furthermore, it will summarize 
the key KSAs necessary to successfully employ the Fire Scout VTUAV.   
E. SCOPE 
The scope will include: 1) a review of Fire Scout and its capabilities, 2) a 
historical review of Fire Scout operations in the U.S. Navy, 3) a cost analysis for 
each type of operator, 4) the benefits associated with each type of operator, and 
5) a summary of KSAs necessary to operate Fire Scout. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology used in this research will consist of the following steps: 
• Conduct a literature review of books, journal articles, magazine 
articles, the Internet, manufacturer data, and military reviews of the 
Fire Scout capabilities. 
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• Conduct a literature review of books, journal articles, magazine 
articles, the Internet, manufacturer data, and review military usage of 
Fire Scout to date. 
• Examine the cost to train a rated pilot officer.   
• Examine the cost to train a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO). 
• Examine the cost to train an Operations Specialist (OS). 
• Examine the cost to train an air vehicle operator (AVO) utilizing the 
manufacturer of Fire Scout, Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC).  
• Utilize Human Resources Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT) to examine the 
overall lifecycle cost of each type operator to include rated pilots, 
commissioned Surface Warfare Officers, and Operations Specialist 
enlisted operators.   
• Conduct a thorough review of the benefits associated with each type of 
operator alternative. 
• Utilize the Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classifications and 
Occupational Standards (NEOCS) and Military Occupational 
Specialties (MOS) to summarize the requisite KSAs necessary to be 
an AVO. 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I:  INTRODUCTION:  Establishes the primary purpose of this 
thesis.  Identifies the primary and secondary research questions, provides a 
discussion of UAVs in the military, and describes the scope and methodology 
employed.   
Chapter II:  OVERVIEW OF THE FIRE SCOUT VTUAV:  Provides a brief 
developmental history, budget history, and capabilities of the Fire Scout VTUAV. 
Chapter III:  REVIEW OF FIRE SCOUT OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. 
NAVY:  Provides a brief overview of Fire Scout operational history.   
Chapter IV:  COST COMPARISON FOR TYPE OF AIR VEHICLE 
OPERATOR:  Provides a cost analysis of three types of operator alternatives, to 
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include rated pilots, commissioned Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), and 
Operations Specialist (OS) enlisted operators.  Cost analysis includes training 
costs as well as lifecycle costs for each alternative.   
Chapter V:  BENEFIT COMPARISON FOR TYPE OF AIR VEHICLE 
OPERATOR:  Identifies training, manning, physiological, cultural, and safety 
benefits associated with each type of operator alternative.   
Chapter VI: SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE, SKILL, AND 
ABILITY (KSA) REQUIREMENTS FOR A MILITARY AIR VEHICLE OPERATOR:  
Provides a brief review of UAV KSAs as identified by the U.S. military. 
Chapter VII:  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:  
Provides proposed answers to the primary and secondary questions.  Offers 
recommendations as to who should fly the Fire Scout VTUAV, based on a cost 
benefit analysis.  Provides recommendations for further research and study.   
 6 
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE FIRE SCOUT VTUAV 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical 
Take-Off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) is an 
unmanned autonomous helicopter.  Fire Scout is currently being used by the 
United States Navy aboard small combatants and overland in Afghanistan.  The 
Fire Scout is designed to provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, 
situational awareness, and over-the-horizon precision targeting support in order 
to augment traditional manned helicopter missions.  Derived from the Schweizer 
Aircraft commercial airframe, the Fire Scout utilizes reliable turbine power and 
shares over 50 percent commonality of mechanical parts with this FAA certified 
aircraft, which allowed for a short development schedule.1  
 
Figure 1.   Fire Scout VTUAV (From Northrop Grumman Corporation)2 
 
                                            
1  Northrop Grumman Corporation. "MQ-8B Fire Scout." Northrop Grumman. 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/index.html (accessed March 
14, 2011). 
2 Ibid.   
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When the Navy was withdrawing RQ-2 Pioneers Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV) from service, it began to seek a second generation UAV with 
vertical takeoff and landing capabilities.  Bell, Sikorsky, and a collaboration of 
Teledyne Ryan and Schweizer Aircraft competed for the contract as finalists with 
Ryan-Schweizer selected as the winner in the spring of 2000.  Although the 
project was regarded as satisfactory, the Navy decided it did not meet their 
needs and cut funding in December 2001.  Development continued, however, 
and Northrop Grumman pitched a range of improved configurations to potential 
buyers.  The new Fire Scout gained interest from the US Army and NGC was 
awarded a contract in 2003 for seven RQ-8B aircraft.  As development continued 
with the Army, the new Fire Scout program revived interest with the Navy and 
began providing financial backing again in 2005.  The first flight of a Naval MQ-
8B Fire Scout took place in late 2006 at NAS Patuxent River.3   
The Fire Scout’s first shipboard landing was accomplished aboard USS 
Nashville in January 2006.  The event marked the first time an unmanned 
helicopter had landed autonomously on a US Navy ship at sea.4  The Fire 
Scout’s darkest hour occurred in August 2010 when it became unresponsive to 
commands during testing and entered restricted airspace around Washington 
D.C. Operators had lost the control link for about 30 minutes before they were 
able to shift control to another ground control station and regain control of the 
aircraft.5  
                                            
3  Sherri Pineda. "MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Unmanned Aircraft System." Northrop 
Grumman. http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/fs-fact-
sheet.pdf (accessed March 12, 2011). 
4  Naval Air Systems Command Public Affairs. "Autonomous Fire Scout UAV Lands on Ship." 
Navy.mil. January 2006. http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=22038 (accessed 
March 16, 2011). 
5  Kristin Quinn. "Fire Scout Incident Called 'Learning Experience'." Defense News Periodical. 
2010. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4759558&c=AME&s=AIR (accessed March 16, 
2011). 
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The incident resulted in the grounding of all 6 operational Fire Scouts while an 
official inquiry was conducted since the aircraft did not return to the originating 
airfield as designed.6  
 
Figure 2.   Fire Scout VTUAV landing aboard USS Nashville (From Naval Air 
Systems Command Public Affairs)7 
The first deployment of Fire Scout began in October 2009 aboard USS 
McInerney.  Fire Scout completed its first ‘blue-water’ deployment (2nd 
deployment overall) in August of 2011 aboard USS Halyburton. In May of 2011, 
three MQ-8Bs were sent to support operations of Afghanistan.  Due to the 
success of this detachment, Naval Air Systems Command awarded Northrop 
Grumman a follow-on $18.65 million contract in late September of 2011 in order 
to maintain the Afghanistan detachment for another year.  Additional funding was 
also received to begin development of weapons systems for the Fire Scout.  Fire 
Scouts’ most recent deployment began in January of 2012 aboard USS Simpson 
and Operational Evaluation is currently scheduled for the spring of 2012.8   
                                            
6 Elisabeth Bumiller. "Navy Drone Violated Washington Airspace." The New York Times. 
August 25, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/us/26drone.html?_r=1 (accessed March 
16, 2011). 
7 Naval Air Systems Command Public Affairs. "Autonomous Fire Scout UAV Lands on Ship." 
8  David Donald. "Fire Scout Proves Its Value in Middle East Warzones." AIN Online. 
November 15, 2011. http://www.ainonline.com/?q=aviation-news/dubai-air-show/2011-11-14/fire-
scout-proves-its-value-middle-east-warzones (accessed December 5, 2011). 
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After Operational Evaluation is complete, the Navy will craft a formal 
report to determine whether Fire Scout is suitable for the mission and a full-rate 
production decision will follow.  The US Navy has received 11 aircraft with 19 on 
contract and has requested a total of 168 Fire Scouts.9  Should the overall plan 
come to fruition, each Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is expected to deploy with 3 
Fire Scouts while small deck combatants such as Cruisers, Destroyers, and 
Frigates will be augmented with Fire Scouts as well.10 Fire Scout is expected to 
operate alongside and augment the missions of the traditional small combatant 
manned helicopter, the MH-60R Seahawk. 
B. BUDGET HISTORY 
A chronological breakdown of the program acquisition cost is as follows: 
FY01: $93.7 million, all Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) 
FY05: $59.1 million, all Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation 
(RDT&E) 
FY06: $94.2 million, all RDT&E. Includes 2 VTUAVs 
FY07: $142.7 million ($105.1M RDT&E, $36.4M for 4 MQ-8Bs) 
FY08: $89 million ($50.2M RDT&E, $38.8M for 3 MQ-8Bs) 
FY09: $97.9 million ($22.9M RDT&E, $75.0M for 5 MQ-8Bs plus spares) 
  Source:  Defense Industry Daily (2010) and multiple others. 
The gap in spending from FY01 to FY05 was due to the Navy 
discontinuing the program at the end of 2001, until the Navy regained interest 
and began reinvesting again in FY05.  In May 2007, the US Department of 
Defense announced that the Fire Scout VTUAV had reached Milestone C in the 
                                            
9  Amy Butler. "Fire Scout to Gather Intel, Hunt Pirates." Aviation Week. February 9, 2011. 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awst/2011/02/07/AW_02_07_2011_p
31-286989.xml&channel=defense (accessed March 17, 2011). 
10  Barry. Rosenberg. "LCS Delays Place Fire Scout on Alternate Ship." Defense News 
Periodical. 2008. http://www.defensenews.com/osd_story.php?sh=VSDS&i=3381948 (accessed 
March 16, 2011). 
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acquisition process, the first UAV in the Navy and the third UAV of all services to 
reach this milestone.11 With Milestone C reached, the US Navy awarded three 
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contracts to Northrop Grumman.  The first 
LRIP contract was awarded for the Fire Scout VTUAV program in June 2007.  
The program met the goals of the first contract, which prompted the Navy to 
award the LRIP 2 contract in September 2008.  The LRIP 3 contract was 
awarded in early 2009, for an amount not to exceed $40 million, for the 
procurement of three VTUAV systems.12  In May 2009, the Navy awarded 
Northrop Grumman a contractor logistics support contract valued at $5 million for 
the first year with options for three additional years for a total of $19 million which 
will provide for a long-term maintenance program for the Fire Scout.13  The 
program to date is valued at $2.6 billion and is managed by Naval Air Systems 
Command.14 
C. ACQUISITION COST PER UNIT 
Trying to determine a precise acquisition price per unit at this stage of 
development is difficult, but several studies have offered estimated prices.  
According to a recent Aviation Week article, the total contract is $2.6 billion for 
168 Fire Scouts, which equates to a $15.5 million per unit cost.15  Another study 
                                            
11  Rene Freeland. "MQ-8B Fire Scout to Enter Production: A First for a US Navy Unmanned 
Air System." Global Newswire: Northrop Grumman News Release. May 31, 2007. 
http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=120630 (accessed March 16, 
2011). 
12 Sherri Pineda. "Northrop Grumman Receives US Navy MQ-8B Fire Scout Contract Award 
for Third Year of Low Rate Initial Production." Global Newswire: Northrop Grumman News 
Release. February 23, 2009. 
http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=160037 (accessed March 16, 
2011). 
13  Sherri Pineda. "Northrop Grumman MQ-8B Fire Scout Program Awarded Contractor 
Logistics Support Contract." Northrop Grumman New Release. May 4, 2009. 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/pma266/pdfs/NR_FS_CLSAward_NAVAIR09-486_4.29.09.pdf 
(accessed March 17, 2011). 
14  Amy Butler. "Fire Scout to Gather Intel, Hunt Pirates." Aviation Week. February 9, 2011. 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awst/2011/02/07/AW_02_07_2011_p
31-286989.xml&channel=defense (accessed March 17, 2011). 
15  Ibid. 
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indicates a total production cost of $2.2 billion for 177 Fire Scouts, which equates 
to about $12.4 million per unit.16  A third study conducted by Defense Industry 
Daily indicates prices based on the low-rate production models have cost 
approximately $10.5 to $15 million each, while the ultimate average per unit cost 
is expected to be about $9.4 million.17  Each system includes one MQ-8B Fire 
Scout VTUAV, electro-optical payloads, a ground control station, a light harpoon 
grid, a UAV common automatic recovery system, and 2 portable electronic 
displays. 
The Fire Scout is considerably less expensive than the manned helicopter 
it will operate alongside, the MH-60R Seahawk.  The price per unit if an MH-60R 
Seahawk is more easily attained due to the number already built and delivered.  
Studies conducted while analyzing the FY12 Pentagon Spending Request 
estimate cost per unit of an MH-60R Seahawk to be $47.5 million with a total 
program cost of $14,241 million.18  Based on the most conservative Fire Scout 
figures, this means that a Fire Scout currently costs a third of a MH-60R and 
could be as low as a fifth of the cost as the program matures and more Fire 
Scouts are built.   
                                            
16  Daegel.com. "Fire Scout VTUAV." Daegel.com. March 10, 2011. 
http://www.deagel.com/Tactical-Unmanned-Rotorcrafts/RQ-8A-Fire-Scout_a000557001.aspx 
(accessed March 17, 2011). 
17  Defense Industry Daily. "The Fire Scout VTUAV Program: By Land and Sea." Defense 
Industry Daily. August 30, 2010. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-fire-scout-vtuav-
program-by-land-and-by-sea-updated-01316/ (accessed March 17, 2011). 
18  Chris Hellman. "Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2012 Pentagon Spending Request." National 
Priorities Project. February 13, 2011. http://newprioritiesnetwork.org/resources/analysis-of-the-
fiscal-year-2012-pentagon-spending-request (accessed March 17, 2011). 
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Figure 3.   Fire Scout VTUAV alongside H-60 (From sUAS News)19 
D. OPERATIONAL COSTS 
According to Captain Tim Dunigan, Fire Scout Program Manager at the 
time of the article, the Fire Scout is able to provide the same radar coverage as 
its manned counterpart but uses 3.7 times less fuel and 14.5 times less 
maintenance man-hours.20  For comparison, a Fire Scout requires 2 
maintenance-hours per flight compared to mid-twenties for an H-60 according to 
Dunigan.  Most of the savings comes from systems that the Fire Scout does not 
have, such as crew support, hydraulics, instruments, fire suppression, auxiliary 
drive gear boxes, auxiliary power unit, retractable landing gear, actuated doors, 
electronic countermeasures and wheels/tires/brakes/anti-skid.  Dunigan claims 
that the total cost to fly a Fire Scout is 75 percent less than an H-60.21 
                                            
19  sUAS News. Fire Scout Set to Operate from USS Halyburton. 
http://www.suasnews.com/2010/12/3078/firescout-set-to-operate-from-uss-halyburton/ (accessed 
February 8, 2012). 




The Fire Scout is designed to be comparable with current H-60 manned 
helicopter capabilities in regards to Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) missions.22  Fire Scout has a service ceiling of 20,000 
feet with speeds of 115+ knots. Endurance with a maximum payload is over 5 
hours and can be as high as 8 hours with a baseline payload at 110 nautical 
miles.23  For comparison, an MH-60R has a service ceiling of 13,000 feet with 
dash speeds of 135 knots and typically averages just over 3 hours of endurance 
with about 1 hour of on-station time during a 125 nautical mile mission radius.24  
Like the MH-60R manned helicopter, the Fire Scout mission systems suite 
includes Infrared Imaging, Electro Optical Imaging, Communication Relay, 
Maritime Radar, and a Laser Designator. The Fire Scout is also capable of more 
covert operations than the H-60 Seahawk due to its small size and quieter 
operation.  According to personnel aboard USS McInerney, the Fire Scout flew 
within a mile of the ship at an altitude of 500 feet and was not seen or heard by 






                                            
22  Sherri Pineda. "MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Unmanned Aircraft System." Northrop 
Grumman. http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/fs-fact-
sheet.pdf (accessed March 12, 2011). 
23  Northrop Grumman Corporation. "MQ-8B Fire Scout." Northrop Grumman. 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/index.html (accessed March 
14, 2011). 
24  Sikorsky Corporation. "MH-60R Helicopter." Sikorsky.com. 
http://wwww.sikorsky.com/Products (accessed March 12, 2011). 
25  Richard Burgess. "Headed for the Med: Navy's Fire Scout gears up foroperational 
evauluation, full deployment." The Fleet. 2010. 








Figure 4.   Fire Scout Cutaway (From Northrop Grumman Corporation)26 
                                            
26 Northrop Grumman Corporation. "MQ-8B Fire Scout." Northrop Grumman Corporation. 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/firescout-new-
brochure.pdf (accessed February 14, 2012). 
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Figure 5.   Fire Scout VTUAV Specifications (From Northrop Grumman 
Corporation)27 
F. HUMAN INTERFACE COSTS 
The debate regarding who will fly the Fire Scout, a rated pilot versus 
commissioned officer or enlisted VTUAV operators, is expected to intensify 
before being resolved.  Captain Tim Dunigan, a pilot himself, says, “It has no 
pilot.  It is controlled by an air vehicle operator, which has more commonality with 
an air traffic controller than a pilot.”28  That being said, rated pilots are still flying 
Fire Scout at this time.  
                                            
27 Northrop Grumman Corporation. "MQ-8B Fire Scout." Northrop Grumman Corporation. 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/firescout-new-
brochure.pdf (accessed February 14, 2012). 
28  Ann Jefferson. "Prey Station." All Hands—Magazine of the US Navy, September 2009. 
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The main driver for this debate is money versus ability.  It is well 
documented that the cost per sailor in the Navy has risen sharply over the past 
decade and this issue hits right at the heart of the problem.29  A 1999 study by 
the United States General Accounting Office found that according to DOD, the 
cost to train each military pilot through basic flight training is about $1 million, 
while the cost to fully train a pilot with the requisite operational experience can be 
more than $9 million.30  These costs vary significantly depending on the type of 
aircraft and include costs over time to include such things as pilot retention 
bonuses.  Training an enlisted UAV operator would cost just a fraction of that.31   
The Navy is not the only service battling with this issue.  A 2009 article in 
Air Force Times cited an Air Force audit that estimated the Air Force could save 
$1.5 billion over the next 6 years by having airmen fly UAVs instead of rated 
pilots.  The report claims that it costs more than $2.6 million to train a fighter pilot 
and about $600,000 to train an airlift pilot.  The audit claims that that a UAV pilot 
can be trained for a little more than $135,000 per pilot.32  Even using the most 
conservative figures, this means training a UAV pilot would cost less than a 
quarter of a rated pilot.  These savings are even more significant when pay, 
retention, and retirement pays are factored in to the total cost.  
This thesis will use a slightly different approach to determine operator 
costs.  Through the use of the Human Resources Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT) 
and previous research studies, this paper will quantify and compare the life cycle 
manpower costs of a rated pilot versus a commissioned Surface Warfare Officer 
(SWO) versus an Operations Specialist (OS) enlisted operator.  This thesis will 
                                            
29  Kevin Heiss et al.  Navy Manpower & Personnel. PowerPoint Presentation. Monterey: 
Naval Postgraduate School, February 28, 2011. 
30  United States General Accounting Office. "Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Better 
Define Pilot Requirements and Promotion Retention." 1999. 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99211.pdf (accessed March 12, 2011). 
31  Ann Jefferson. "Prey Station." All Hands - Magazine of the US Navy, September 2009. 
32  Michael Hoffman. "UAV Pilot Career Field could save $1.5B." Air Force Times. March 1, 
2009. http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_uav_audit_030109/ (accessed March 
17, 2011). 
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also provide a benefit comparison of the aforementioned alternatives.  Ultimately, 
recommendations will be made as to who should operate the Fire Scout based 
on a cost benefit analysis approach.   
 19 
III. REVIEW OF FIRE SCOUT OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. NAVY 
A. USS MCINERNEY (FFG 8) 
The first deployment of Fire Scout began in October 2009 aboard USS 
McInerney.  When Fire Scout deployed with USS McInerney, the Detachment 
provided one extra rated pilot to operate their two Fire Scouts.33  Fire Scout 
scored its first “mission kill” during a routine test flight in April 2010 when Fire 
Scout detected a “go-fast” speedboat engaged in smuggling cocaine in the 
Eastern Pacific.  Fire Scout tracked the smugglers for hours thus allowing the 
ship to pursue and ultimately confiscate 60kg of cocaine and detain several 
suspects.34  
During the deployment, the Navy conducted a trial training program for 
Enlisted Air Vehicle Operators (AVO) in order to help determine who will 
ultimately fly Fire Scout in the long run.35  The trial was conducted with two 
sailors, a Senior Chief Petty Officer and a very junior Airman Air Traffic Controller 
fresh out of A-school.  The Navy chose different levels of experience to help 
officials evaluate the skill level and maturity necessary to operate Fire Scout. The 
Navy was to scrutinize the training process as well as their performance in hopes 
of determining if actual rated pilots are required to fly Fire Scout.  For the Navy, a 
rated pilot is an individual that has completed all formal aviation training 
requirements as set forth by the Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) and is 
subsequently designated as a Naval Aviator.  Up to that time, only H-60 
Seahawk pilots and Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) civilians had piloted 
                                            
33  Richard Burgess. "Headed for the Med: Navy's Fire Scout gears up foroperational 
evauluation, full deployment." The Fleet. 2010. 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/pma266/pdfs/HeadedForTheMed.pdf (accessed March 17, 2011). 
34  U.S 4th Fleet Public Affairs. "Fire Scout Scores First Drug Bust with McInerney." Navy.mil. 
April 7, 2010. http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52461 (accessed March 16, 
2011). 
35  Andrew Tilghman. "Fire Scout Program could open door for Enlisted." Navy Times.com. 
August 15, 2009. http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/08/navy_enlisted_uav_081509w/ 
(accessed March 17, 2011). 
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Fire Scout for the Navy, but now these two sailors were able to perform the same 
task under close supervision after obtaining their private pilot license and 
completing a five-week course on the Fire Scout.36  The results of this study 
have not been publicly released, but the Senior Chief Petty Officer was utilized 
once again to operate Fire Scout in a deployment aboard USS Halyburton.   
 
Figure 6.   Fire Scout VTUAV landing aboard USS McInerney (From Northrop 
Grumman Corporation)37 
B. USS HALYBURTON (FFG 40) 
Fire Scout completed its first ‘blue-water’ deployment (2nd deployment 
overall) in August of 2011 while supporting counter-piracy missions and 
operations in Libya aboard USS Halyburton.  A ‘blue water’ certification means it 
can fly without a land divert requirement.38   
                                            
36  Andrew Tilghman. "Fire Scout Program could open door for Enlisted." Navy Times.com. 
August 15, 2009. http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/08/navy_enlisted_uav_081509w/ 
(accessed March 17, 2011). 
37 Northrop Grumman Corporation.  MQ-8B Navy Fire Scout Images. 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/gallery.html (accessed 
February 8, 2012). 
38  NAVAIR PMA-266. "HSL-42 Det 'Motley Two' poised to make history with Fire Scout 
UAV." NAVAIR. http://www.navair.navy.mil/pma266/pdfs/HSL.pdf (accessed March 17, 2011). 
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This deployment found Fire Scout very involved in real-world operations.  
During ISR and targeting operations in Libya, pro-Ghaddafi forces shot down a 
Fire Scout.39  During this deployment, Fire Scout also conducted counter-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden and conducted ISR missions in support of 
Operation Unified Protector.  The deployment also marked the first simultaneous 
employment of a manned H-60 and Fire Scout during transits in the Straits of 
Hormuz and Bab Al Mandeb.40 
The same Senior Chief Petty Officer that deployed on USS McInerney as 
a Fire Scout AVO once again deployed with USS Halyburton.  Although he will 
not have a say in whether or not enlisted personnel will operate Fire Scout in the 
future, others offered positive indications regarding the possibility.  Paul Achille, 
the deputy program manager for the Fire Scout Program office, was quoted as 
saying, “I think Senior Chief Diets demonstrated an ability to do it.”41  Rear 
Admiral William Shannon, the program executive officer for unmanned aviation 
and strike weapons, said, “very, very capable enlisted sailors should eventually 
fly UAVs or he and other in his office have absolutely failed in our jobs.”42 Upon 





                                            
39  David Donald. "Fire Scout Proves Its Value in Middle East Warzones." AIN Onlie. 
November 15, 2011. http://www.ainonline.com/?q=aviation-news/dubai-air-show/2011-11-14/fire-
scout-proves-its-value-middle-east-warzones (accessed December 5, 2011). 
40  NAVAIR PMA-266. "Halyburton, Embarked Fire Scouts Return From Demanding 
Deployment." NAVAIR. August 4, 2011. 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/pma266/pdfs/HalyburtonFireScoutReturn.pdf (accessed February 9, 
2012). 
41  Joshua Stewart.  "Senior chief a test case for enlisted pilots." Navy Times. November 6, 
2011. http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/11/navy-senior-chief-blazes-trail-enlisted-uav-pilots-
110611w/ (accessed February 9, 2012). 
42 Ibid. 
 22 
I felt honored and privileged to be the Navy’s sole enlisted operator 
for the Fire Scout. It is a great responsibility and I do believe other 
enlisted guys can do it too.  Having been part of the fleet liaison 
office at the Fire Scout program office in Patuxent River, Md., I was 
picked to do this and be the test case to determine what 
requirements were needed for an enlisted Sailor to operate the 
system.  Also, I was selected for this role because of my 
experience in working with the Pioneer unmanned air vehicle a few 
years back in the late nineties.43 
C. AFGHANISTAN DETACHMENT 
The first overland deployment of the Fire Scout began in April of 2011 in 
Kunduz, Afghanistan.  Three Fire Scouts deployed in response to a Department 
of Defense (DoD) ISR Task Force request to provide intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance services in northern Afghanistan.  The detachment is a 
government owned/contractor operated deployment that relied heavily on civilian 
contractor support and manning from Northrop Grumman Corporation and was 
comprised of 21 contractors and 7 military personnel.44 
 
                                            
43  Stephen Diets. "Navy's only enlisted operator shares Fire Scout deployment experience." 
Navy Live. August 4, 2011. http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2011/08/04/navy’s-only-enlisted-operator-
shares-fire-scout-deployment-experience/ (accessed February 9, 2012). 
44 U.S. Navy. "Fire Scout UAV Supports Operations in Afghanistan." Defence Talk. June 16, 
2011. http://www.defencetalk.com/fire-scout-uav-supports-operations-in-afghanistan-34974/ 
(accessed February 9, 2012). 
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Figure 7.   Fire Scout being loaded into C-17 transport at Naval Air Station 
Patuxent River (From sUAS News)45 
Within a month of arrival, the detachment was able to commence flight 
operations and flew over 80 sorties and 200 hours of flight time in the first month, 
and is contracted to be able to support 300 hours per month.46  After six months 
of solid performance as a go-to ISR asset, the Navy extended the service 
contract for another year with an $18.65 million contract awarded that will keep 
the detachment in Afghanistan for most of 2012. According to Rick Pagel, Fire 
Scout operations lead for NGC, the detachment flew over 400 flights and 1500 
hours in the first five months of operations.47  The success of this deployment 
serves as proof that civilian contractors, vice rated pilots, are able to successfully 
employ Fire Scout as AVOs. 
                                            
45 Gary Mortimer. "U.S. Navy Extends Afghan Tour of Duty for Northrop Grumman-Built Fire 
Scout." sUAS News. November 8, 2011. http://www.suasnews.com/2011/11/9952/u-s-navy-
extends-afghan-tour-of-duty-for-northrop-grumman-built-fire-scout/ (accessed February 9, 2012). 
46 U.S. Navy. "Fire Scout UAV Supports Operations in Afghanistan." 




Figure 8.   Det Kunduz (From Jurta, et al.)48 
D. USS SIMPSON (FFG 56) 
Fire Scout began its most recent deployment in January 2012 aboard USS 
Simpson.  The deployment will mark the first time that reservists will operate and 
maintain Fire Scout.  Also for the first time, Fire Scout will deploy solo without 
any other manned helicopters on board.49  HSL-60 personnel began preparing 
for deployment in early August by receiving training for operating and maintaining 
the drone.  Simpson is scheduled to participate in exercises in the Mediterranean 
and near West Africa.  
 
 
                                            
48 Daniel Jurta et al. MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV Manning Cost Benefit Analysis. EMBA Project 
Report, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 
49  Joshua Stewart. "Reservists deploy to operate Fire Scout drone." Navy Times. February 
6, 2012. http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/02/navy-reservists-deploy-operate-fire-scout-
drone-helicopter-020612w/ (accessed February 9, 2012). 
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This deployment is part of an ongoing effort to determine manning for Fire Scout.  
According to Captain Patrick Smith, Fire Scout program manager, a “mixed bag” 
of reservists, active duty sailors, and contractors is being considered for when 
the drone is fully operational.50 
                                            
50 Joshua Stewart. "Reservists deploy to operate Fire Scout drone." Navy Times. February 6, 
2012. http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/02/navy-reservists-deploy-operate-fire-scout-drone-
helicopter-020612w/ (accessed February 9, 2012). 
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IV. COST COMPARISON FOR TYPE OF AIR VEHICLE 
OPERATOR 
A. COST COMPARISON DESCRIPTION 
For the purposes of cost comparison, six active duty service member 
lifecycle costs will be analyzed.  The comparison groups are comprised of two 
ranks, one junior and one senior, for each category—rated pilots, commissioned 
Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), and Operations Specialist (OS) enlisted 
personnel.  Two ranks were chosen in order to illustrate the cost difference 
between a junior and senior operator alternative in each category. The three 
categories—rated pilots, SWOs, and OS enlisted personnel—were chosen as 
they are logical Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) alternatives for Fire Scout.  Rated 
pilots were chosen because Fire Scout has been flown predominantly by 
helicopter pilots aboard small surface combatants and are currently the targeted 
group to become Fire Scout operators.  Surface Warfare Officers were chosen as 
a category because they are the most abundant type of officer aboard small 
surface combatants.  Operations Specialist enlisted personnel were chosen 
because they are very familiar with helicopter missions aboard small surface 
combatants.  The purpose for these comparisons is to provide cost alternatives 
for Fire Scout AVOs. 
1. Human Resources Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT)  
The tool utilized for this cost comparison is the Navy’s Human Resources 
Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT).  The description of this tool is provided on the 






Human Resources Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT) is a cost analysis tool 
designed to help Navy leaders determine the most cost-effective 
manpower mix for the Navy. Navy manpower planners will be able to 
make better sourcing decisions for manpower with HRCAT's improved 
personnel cost estimates. The web-based tool is easy to use, asking the 
user to determine specific parameters concerning a military billet, such as 
specialty, grade, length of service, and location. The model will determine 
total annual cost for the billet.51 
The model is very inclusive of costs for each type of service member.  
Detailed descriptions of cost calculations can be found in Appendix A of this 
report.  Itemized values for each cost, including everything from basic pay, 
special pay, bonuses, training costs, sea pay, and even PCS and recruiting costs 
for each type of service member are displayed in Tables 1–6.  The model is 
designed to provide total amortized annual costs for each service member as 
defined in the parameters.  Adjustable parameters include pay grade, years of 
service, locality, dependents, designator, and subspecialty.  By utilizing this tool, 
total annual costs can be estimated for each type of Fire Scout operator 
alternatives. 
B. RATED PILOT COSTS 
1. Cost to Train Military Pilots 
a. Accession and Flight School training  
The cost to train rated pilots is broken down into accession cost 
and flight training cost.  Accession costs are described in Appendix A, but 
generally include commissioning source costs such as Naval Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (NROTC), Officer Training School (OCS), or the Naval Academy.  
Typical flight training pipeline for a rated pilot Naval Aviator includes Aviation 
Preflight Indoctrination (API), primary flight training, advanced flight training, and 
specific fleet platform training.  A 1999 study by the United States General 
Accounting Office (USGAO) estimated these costs to be about $1 million through 
basic flight training and more than $9 million for a fully trained pilot with requisite 
                                            
51  HRCAT Manpower Costing. What the HRCAT Manpower Costing Tool is... 
http://hrcat.serco-na.com/ (accessed December 8, 2011). 
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operational experience.52  As displayed in Tables 1 and 2, HRCAT estimates the 
amortized annual flight training cost to be $78,100.30 for rated pilots and 
accession cost to be $20,340.48.  When adjusted for HRCAT’s calculated 
average naval aviator career length of 10 years, HRCAT’s flight training cost 
calculation is comparable with the USGAO flight training calculation of 
approximately $1 million.  This is also comparable with an Air Force audit that 
claims it costs more than $2.6 million to train a fighter pilot and about $600,000 to 
train an airlift pilot.53 
2. HRCAT Results 
Table 1.   Rated Pilot—Lieutenant (From HRCAT website) 
 
                                            
52 United States General Accounting Office. "Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Better 
Define Pilot Requirements and Promotion Retention." 1999. 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99211.pdf (accessed March 12, 2011). 
53  Michael Hoffman. "UAV Pilot Career Field could save $1.5B." Air Force Times. March 1, 
2009. http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_uav_audit_030109/ (accessed March 
17, 2011). 
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Table 2.   Rated Pilot—Lieutenant Commander (From HRCAT website) 
 
 
3. Description of Costs to Retain Military Pilots54 
a. Flight Pay:  Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) 
Section 301a: Financial incentive for officers to serve as 
military aviators throughout a military career. Payment 
ranges from $125 to $840 per month, determined by years of 
aviation service as an officer.  Entitlement pay. 
b. Bonuses:  Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) 
Section 301b: Financial incentive to retain qualified, 
experienced officer aviators who have completed their Active 
Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) to remain on active duty for 
a specified period of additional service.   
 
                                            
54  Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness. "Special and Incentive Pay." 
Military Compensation. http://militarypay.defense.gov/pay/specialindex.html#301aa (accessed 
December 8, 2012). 
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Services may pay up to $25K for each year of service 
agreement, regardless of the length of contract; through 25 
years of aviation service; and to aviators in grade 0–6.  
Discretionary Pay.   
C. COMMISSIONED OFFICER COSTS 
1. Cost to Train Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) 
a. Accession and SWO training  
As with pilots, SWO training costs are broken down by accession 
and SWO training pipeline costs.  HRCAT estimates the SWO amortized annual 
accession cost to be the same as rated pilots, $20,340, as displayed in Tables 3 
and 4.  The amortized annual pipeline training costs, however, are significantly 
less for SWOs, $11,953.89 for a Lieutenant and $22,837.72 for a Lieutenant 
Commander. 
2. HRCAT Results 




Table 4.   Surface Warfare Officer—Lieutenant Commander (From HRCAT 
website) 
 
3. Description of Costs to Retain Surface Warfare Officers55 
a. Special Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
Section 318:  Financial incentive for qualified, experienced 
Special Warfare Officers to remain on active duty beyond 
their initial ADSO.  Up to $15K per year payable to eligible 
officers.  Discretionary pay; only Navy uses this pay 
authority. 
b. Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Continuation Pay  
Section 319:  Financial incentive for SWOs selected for 
Department Head (DH) to agree to remain on active duty to 
complete that tour. Up to $50K total payable to eligible 
officers.  Discretionary pay; Navy use this pay authority. 
                                            
55 Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness. "Special and Incentive Pay." 
Military Compensation. http://militarypay.defense.gov/pay/specialindex.html#301aa (accessed 
December 8, 2012). 
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c. Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) or Bonus for 
Assignment to High Priority Unit 
Section 355: Financial incentive to address skill-specific 
retention problems. Up to $200K total ($100K for reserve 
component members) is payable in CSRB to an eligible 
member over a career. Discretionary pay—all Services use 
this pay authority.  
D. ENLISTED PERSONNEL COSTS 
1. Cost to Train Operations Specialist (OS) Enlisted Personnel 
a. Accession and Operations Specialist (OS) “A” school 
and “C” School costs 
As with the commissioned officers, cost to train an Operations 
Specialist is broken down into accession costs and training costs.  As expected, 
these costs are significantly less than those calculated for rated pilots and 
SWOs.  HRCAT estimates the amortized annual accession cost to be $925.21 
and C-school training cost to be $2066.83 for Operations Specialist enlisted 
personnel, as displayed in Table 5. 
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2. HRCAT Results 
Table 5.   Operations Specialist—Petty Officer 3rd Class (From HRCAT 
website) 
 
Table 6.   Operations Specialist—Chief Petty Officer (From HRCAT website) 
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3. Description of Costs to Retain Operations Specialists Enlisted 
Personnel56 
a. Enlistment Bonus (EB) 
Section 309:  To provide incentive for persons to enlist in the 
armed forces. The maximum payable by law is $40K. 
Discretionary bonus—all Services use this bonus authority. 
b. Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) 
Section 308:  To provide incentive for an adequate number 
of qualified enlisted members to reenlist in designated critical 
military specialties where retention levels are insufficient to 
sustain a steady readiness posture imperative for the 
individual Service to accomplish its mission.  The statutory 
maximum payable is $90K for a minimum 3-year 
reenlistment.  Discretionary pay—all Services use this pay 
authority. 
c. Hazardous Duty Incentive Pays 
Section 301(a):  Entitlement pays; payable to enlisted 
members and officers 
E. NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION OPERATOR TRAINING 
COSTS 
Since the Navy has not completed its own Fire Scout training program, 
Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) is currently training all Air Vehicle 
Operators (AVO) and Mission Payload Operators (MPO) for Fire Scout.   
 
                                            
56 Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness. "Special and Incentive Pay." 
Military Compensation. http://militarypay.defense.gov/pay/specialindex.html#301aa (accessed 
December 8, 2012). 
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The exact cost of this training is difficult to ascertain, but a Naval Postgraduate 
School Executive MBA (EMBA) Capstone Project completed in September 2011 
determined training cost by examining existing NGC contracts and consulting 
with NGC personnel in order to translate the data.57   
According to their findings, the cost to train AVOs and MPOs varies 
depending on the source of the trainee.  As described in Appendix H of the 
report, the cost to train a contractor or 3rd party AVO or MPO ranged from 
$43,717 to $48,077.58  The cost to train a military AVO or MPO was more difficult 
to ascertain.  The cost was determined by calculating salary, travel, per diem, 
and NGC instructor costs for classes of three AVOs and three MPOs with the 
ranks of Commander and two Lieutenants.  The cost to train an AVO was 
calculated to be $67,038, and the cost to train a MPO was $24,628, as displayed 
in Appendix G.59   
For standardization of the overall annual cost comparison in Table 7, the 
AVO and MPO training costs were amortized over the average career service 
length as determined by HRCAT—10.48 years for officers and 7.88 years for 
enlisted personnel.  Since the report did not contain any costs to train SWOs or 
enlisted personnel, the cost to train a 3rd party contractor AVO/MPO was used, 
$48,077.  The cost used for rated officer pilots was the average of the AVO and 
MPO training cost, which equates to $45,833.   
F. OVERALL COST COMPARISON RESULTS SUMMARY 
A summation of annual manpower costs for each type of operator 
alternative is displayed in Table 7. For comparison purposes, the Lieutenant 
rated pilot was chosen as the baseline cost in order to determine savings for the 
other AVO alternatives. 
                                            
57 Daniel Jurta et al. MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV Manning Cost Benefit Analysis. EMBA Project 
Report, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 
58 Ibid.   
59 Ibid. 
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Table 7.   Total Amortized Annual Cost per Operator Alternative 
 
The cost savings for not utilizing rated pilots are significant, as 
represented in Table 7.  For example, the cost of one Lieutenant rated pilot is 
nearly three times more expensive per year than an Operations Specialist 3rd 
Class Petty Officer.  Assuming the Navy purchases 168 Fire Scouts as currently 
planned, and each Fire Scout has three AVOs and three MPOs to ensure 24-
hour coverage, the annual cost increase for the Navy by using Lieutenant rated 
pilots instead of Petty Officer 3rd Class Operations Specialists is over $149 
million.  Multiply this annual cost increase times the average career service 
length of an officer and the extra cost incurred by the Navy is over $1.4 billion.  
Granted, not all 168 Fire Scouts will be deployed at the same time nor will all 





























































by utilizing enlisted personnel to operate Fire Scout vice rated pilots.  As another 
example, if only half of the Fire Scouts were deployed with 2 crews each 
comprised of Operations Specialist Chief Petty Officers, the savings would still 
equate to almost half a billion dollars over the average officer career service 
length.  Manpower costs over a 10-year period for various AVO alternative, as 
well as number of Fire Scout crews, are displayed in Table 8.  These figures are 
comparable to an Air Force audit cited in the Air Force Times that estimated the 
Air Force could save $1.5 billion over the next 6 years by having airmen fly UAVs 
instead of rated pilots.60  
Table 8.   Total Manpower Cost Comparison Over 10-Year Period 
 
168 Fire Scouts 
3 crews each 
84 Fire Scouts 
2 crews each 
Pilot Lieutenant 
(baseline cost) 




($500 million less) 
$618 million 
($168 million less) 
Operations Specialist 3rd 
Class Petty Officer 
 
$867 million 
($1.4 billion less) 
$289 million 
($497 million less) 
                                            
60 Michael Hoffman. "UAV Pilot Career Field could save $1.5B." Air Force Times. March 1, 
2009. http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_uav_audit_030109/ (accessed March 
17, 2011). 
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V. BENEFIT COMPARISON FOR TYPE OF AIR VEHICLE 
OPERATOR ALTERNATIVE 
A. LENGTH OF TRAINING 
Current training pipelines for rated pilot Naval Aviators take years to 
complete and varies by platform.  For example, the training pipeline for a fully 
qualified fighter pilot can take as long as four years.  In contrast, Northrop 
Grumman Corporation (NGC) can qualify Air Vehicle Operators (AVO) and 
Mission Payload Operators (MPO) in just weeks.  According to a 2009 EMBA 
Project Report published by the Naval Postgraduate School, rated pilots can be 
trained to be Fire Scout AVOs in just 5 weeks and MPOs can be trained in just 3 
weeks.61  The training for the Navy’s sole enlisted operator took 21 days longer 
because he obtained his private pilot license before completing his AVO training 
alongside his rated pilot brethren.62  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
currently requires UAV operators to obtain private pilot licenses even though 
UAVs are not allowed to operate in national airspace alongside manned aircraft 
at this time.63  Even with the private pilot license time factored in for non-rated 
pilots, however, the time requirements are still substantially less than what is 
required to fully train a rated pilot.  It takes only weeks to train a non-pilot AVO 
vice years for a rated pilot.   
B. MANNING CONSTRAINTS AVERTED 
The military is downsizing.  One needs only watch the news or read the 
headlines and it is clear that budgetary constraints are taking its toll on military 
                                            
61  Michael Gerhart et al. MQ-8B Fire Scout Program Support Analysis. EMBA Project 
Report, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 14. 
62  Joshua Stewart.  "Senior chief a test case for enlisted pilots." Navy Times. November 6, 
2011. http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/11/navy-senior-chief-blazes-trail-enlisted-uav-pilots-
110611w/ (accessed February 9, 2012). 
63  Jeremiah Gertler. U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems. CRS Report, Congressional Research 
Service, 2012, 25. 
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manning.  The 2013 Defense Budget reveals plans to cut 100,000 troops.64  
Numerous studies indicate that the price of manning the military is growing 
exponentially and must be reined in.  To address this issue, new ships such as 
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) are being designed with reduced crew sizes and 
smaller berthing areas.  This reduction in crew size will likely lead to remaining 
personnel assuming more tasks and responsibility.  Allowing enlisted personnel 
to operate Fire Scout on ships such as the LCS could not only reduce manning 
requirements by allowing non-aviators to operate Fire Scout, but could also 
provide a great deal of operational flexibility.   
In his 2007 thesis, Matthew Stracker provides a compelling argument to 
allow non-aviation rates to operate Fire Scout.65  Stracker argues that a 
combined Fire Scout and H-60 detachment will exceed the LCS manpower 
requirements by nine personnel.  Furthermore, he argues that an enlisted 
Aviation Administrationman (AZ), an aviation rate, is no more qualified to operate 
Fire Scout than an Operations Specialist (OS), which is a non-aviation rate.  He 
cites that the U.S. Army has already proven that they can take brand new 
enlisted soldiers with no aviation experience and train them to successfully 
operate the Hunter and Shadow UAV systems.  To take this argument one step 
further, one could argue that a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) would also make 
a likely candidate to be a Fire Scout Mission Commander (MC), AVO or MPO.  
SWOs and OSs are already quite familiar with helicopter operations aboard 
surface combatants since they oversee and control tactical employment of 
manned H-60 helicopters from the Combat Information Center (CIC).  By 
allowing a SWO and OS to operate Fire Scout, it eliminates the requirement for 
having rated pilots on board altogether, which would ease berthing constraints on 
small surface combatants, such as LCS.  Another benefit for allowing SWOs and 
                                            
64  David Alexander. "Lawmaker skeptical of cuts in 2013 defense budget." Reuters. 
February 14, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/14/us-usa-defense-panetta-
idUSTRE81D20220120214 (accessed February 15, 2012). 
65  Matthew Stracker. An Operational Manpower Analysis of the RQ-8 Fire Scout Vertical 
Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV). Thesis, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2007. 
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OSs to operate Fire Scout is the ability to conduct “lily pad” operations to ships 
without an air detachment embarked.  This capability would greatly aid mission 
radius and extend on-station times by allowing Fire Scout to land and refuel or be 
controlled by multiple ships.   
The Navy has demonstrated their desire to deploy Fire Scout without H-
60s on board with the recent deployment of USS Simpson.  For the first time, 
Fire Scout deployed on a surface ship without an H-60 manned helicopter 
alongside.66  Although this deployment employs reservist rated pilots operating 
Fire Scout, it illustrates the Navy’s desire to operate and deploy with only Fire 
Scout VTUAVs on board surface ships.  By allowing SWOs and OSs to operate 
Fire Scout, the Navy would be able to employ Fire Scout with current operators 
on board and eliminate the requirement to bring extra rated pilot AVOs.  Although 
this would not alleviate the requirement to bring extra Fire Scout maintainers on 
board, it would eliminate the requirement for extra AVOs.  Perhaps the Navy may 
want to look at training existing shipboard personnel to maintain Fire Scout and 
eliminate even more extra personnel, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
C. PHYSIOLOGY CONSTRAINTS AVERTED 
The U.S. Navy has stringent physical constraints for becoming a Naval 
Aviator.  Naval aircraft operate in challenging environments in which aviators 
must deal with physiological conditions such as vertigo, blackout, sinus blocks, 
nausea, as well as being able to physically fit into small cockpits. In order to 
qualify, an applicant must pass an aviation physical examination to determine 
aeronautical adaptability that tests for things such as eyesight with normal color 
and depth perception, specific physical dimensions, and valsalva ability to name 
a few.   
 
                                            
66  Joshua Stewart. "Reservists deploy to operate Fire Scout drone." Navy Times. February 
6, 2012. http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/02/navy-reservists-deploy-operate-fire-scout-
drone-helicopter-020612w/ (accessed February 9, 2012). 
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A 2000 thesis published by the Naval Postgraduate School found that 14 percent 
of Officer Candidate School (OCS) candidates were found not physically qualified 
and almost 10 percent of Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) 
aviation candidates that passed their pre-commissioning flight physical failed the 
follow-on Naval Operational Medicine Institute (NOMI) physical.67  
 
Figure 9.   F-18 Cockpit (From U.S. Navy)68 
In contrast, physical requirements for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) 
are much less stringent given that the operating environments for the operator 
are drastically different.  Rather than operating in the cockpit of an aircraft, Fire 
Scout AVOs will operate from a ground control station (GCS).  This environment 
obviously eliminates most of the physiological and psychological factors that a 
manned aircraft pilot experiences.   
                                            
67  Stephen Fuchs. "Cost and Benefit Analysis of Alternatives to the Naval Reserve Officer 
Training Corps Flight Physical Screening Process." DTIC Online. September 2000. 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA384315 (accessed February 14, 2012). 
68  U.S. Navy.  US Military Aviation. http://www.salimbeti.com/aviation/images2.htm 
(accessed February 14, 2012). 
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Figure 10.   Fire Scout Ground Control Station (From Northrop Grumman 
Corporation)69 
The U.S. Army determines UAV operator requirements by use of the 
PULHES score.  P stands for physical capacity, U stands for upper extremities, L 
stands for lower extremities, H stands for hearing, E stands for eyes, and S 
stands for psychiatric.  Each category is graded on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being 
the highest ability and 4 being the lowest.  The current PULHES score required 
for an Army UAV operator is 222221.70  As can be seen by this score, the Army 
puts more emphasis on psychiatric ability than physical and physiological 
abilities.  One can expect that the U.S. Navy might require even less stringent 
physical requirements than the Army since the GCS will be located aboard a 
ship, unlike Army soldiers who operate UAVs from the field.  Less stringent 
physiological requirements will open the doors for many more individuals that 
would not otherwise qualify as a rated pilot.  Furthermore, a larger sample size to 
select from lessens recruiting difficulty and eases retention issues. 
                                            
69  Northrop Grumman Corporation. "MQ-8B Fire Scout." Northrop Grumman Corporation. 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/firescout-new-
brochure.pdf (accessed February 14, 2012). 
70  U.S. Army. "MOS 15W - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator." Army Portal. 
http://www.army-portal.com/jobs/aviation/15w.html (accessed February 14, 2012). 
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D. CULTURE 
Numerous studies indicate that culture is a factor when rated pilots are 
forced to fly UAVs.  A 2012 report by the Congressional Research Service 
indicates that the Air Force has been having troubles recruiting and retaining 
rated pilots to fly UAVs for years.71  The Air Force was forced to offer such things 
as preferred follow-on orders and allowing flight time in manned aircraft in order 
to coax their rated pilots into flying UAVs.  The report goes on to indicate that 
operating UAVs might actually attract reservists or improve enlisted recruiting if 
they were allowed to fly them.   Reservists may find that operating UAV from a 
U.S. based GCS is more attractive than deploying overseas to do similar 
missions and that enlisted personnel may be motivated to be pilots.72  Another 
study found that rated pilots might consider UAS operations as a secondary 
mission that might cause a negative stigma within the squadron.73  Most rated 
pilots chose to fly aircraft because of the personal satisfaction that actual flight 
provides.  Forcing these same individuals to stay on the ground and “fly a 
computer” does not provide the appeal that lured them into aviation in the first 
place.   
By allowing enlisted personnel to be Fire Scout operators, they are 
afforded an appealing opportunity to operate an aircraft.  This would also allow 
rated pilots to remain in manned aircraft where most prefer to be.  A 2005 All 
Hands article quoted a Pioneer UAV enlisted operator as saying, “We are the 
only enlisted personnel who get to call ourselves pilots.  I have a strong pride in 
what I do.”74  Allowing enlisted personnel to become AVOs provides a win-win 
culture solution for both rated pilot officers and enlisted personnel.  Culture is 
such a problem in the Air Force that the Air Force Chief of Staff was quoted as 
                                            
71 Jeremiah Gertler. U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems. CRS Report, Congressional Research 
Service, 2012, 26.   
72 Ibid.   
73  Jeremy Bardin et al.  BAMS UAS Manning and Fleet Integration Strategy. EMBA Project 
Report, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School , 2010, 28. 
74  Todd Frantom. "Eyes in the Sky." All Hands, March 2005. 
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saying that the Air Force “must promote a strong and healthy [UAV] community, 
not a leper colony.”75  Allowing non-pilots to be AVOs would create a win-win 
culture of pride for both non-pilots as well as rated pilots. 
 
Figure 11.   U.S. Navy RQ-2 Pioneer (From CRUSER)76 
E. SAFETY 
Some research suggests rated pilots may have more trouble learning to fly 
a UAV than sailors who do not have pilot training. A 2009 Navy Times article 
cited that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) found higher rates of human-
error crashes among Air Force Predators, which are flown by winged pilots, than 
Army Shadows, which are operated by enlisted soldiers.77  While one could 
argue that these mishaps were caused by factors other than who was flying the 
aircraft, others believe that flying an aircraft is much different than managing a 
UAV.  A 2009 Aviation Week article quoted Missy Cummings, a former fighter 
pilot and current Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) researcher, as 
saying UAV operators are “…more like air traffic controllers.  Anyone should be 
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able to operate a UAV with minimal training….these vehicles can fly themselves; 
what we need are people to manage these vehicles.”78  Perhaps a paradigm shift 
is in order to determine what makes a good pilot versus a good UAV operator.  
Military and FAA human factor experts need to identify what the key ingredients 
are for a good AVO, just as they have done for identifying what it takes to be a 
good pilot.   
Forcing rated pilots to operate Fire Scout is going to limit their time in the 
cockpit of manned aircraft.  As a result, currency in manned aircraft is going to 
suffer or completely lapse for rated pilots.  It is well documented that lapses in 
currency and proficiency in aircraft leads to an increased rate of mishaps.  If 
rated pilots are going to fly both manned aircraft and Fire Scout simultaneously, 
currency is going to suffer in both platforms because of time-sharing. Allowing 
non-pilots to become Fire Scout AVOs alleviates the currency problem, as AVOs 
and rated pilots will be only be focused on one platform vice two.   
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VI. SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE, SKILL, AND 
ABILITY (KSA) REQUIREMENTS FOR A MILITARY AIR VEHICLE 
OPERATOR 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Determining the actual Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA) required to 
operate an unmanned aerial system (UAS) is well beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. military have 
been struggling with this issue for years.  The FAA has established a UAS 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee to deal with this complex issue.  This committee 
is comprised of FAA officials and stakeholders in the UAS community to define 
operational and certification requirements.79  The U.S. Air Force is conducting a 
beta program to try to identify what it takes to create an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) operator from scratch.80  Many scholars and researchers have also 
attempted to tackle this issue, but a widely accepted solution has yet to be 
provided.  Instead, this thesis will focus on what the military currently uses to 
define UAV operators. 
B. U.S NAVY ENLISTED CLASSIFICATIONS (NEC) 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. Navy has already established Navy Enlisted Classifications 
(NEC) for both fixed-wing UAVs as well as for the rotary-winged MQ-8B Fire 
Scout.  Figures 12 and 13 are sourced from the 2012 Navy Enlisted Manpower 
and Personnel Classifications and Occupational Standards (NEOCS).  The NECs 
for fixed-wing UAVs such as the RQ-2 Pioneer and RQ-7 Shadow are shown in 
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Figure 12, and the NEC for the rotary-winged MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV is 
shown in Figure 13.   
2. NEC for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) External and Internal 
Pilot  
Enlisted personnel with paygrades ranging from E4 to E7 are authorized 
to be UAV pilots, as displayed in Figure 12. Enlisted personnel successfully flew 
the RQ-2 Pioneer and RQ-7 Shadow from 1986 to 2008 as UAV internal and 
external pilots.81  In 2008, VC-6 was praised by the Chief of Naval Operations for 
being the top rated Shadow UAV operators in Iraq by the Army’s Department of 
Evaluation and Standards.82  
 
Figure 12.   NEC 8362 and 8363:  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle External and 
Internal Pilot (From Bureau of Naval Personnel)83 
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Upon review of the source ratings, it is apparent that the UAV pilot NEC is 
limited to aviation source ratings.  In his 2007 thesis, Mathew Stracker makes a 
compelling argument regarding the source ratings for operating Fire Scout.84  He 
compared the qualifications of an Aviation Administrationman (AZ) to an 
Operations Specialist (OS), and argued that an OS is better suited to operate 
Fire Scout than an AZ.  He argued that the AVO source rating should not be 
limited to aviation ratings only.  
3. NEC for MQ-8B Air Vehicle Operator (AVO)  
In 2009, the Navy established a new NEC for the MV-8B Fire Scout.  The 
MQ-8B Fire Scout AVO is authorized to be operated by enlisted personnel 
paygrades ranging from E4 to E8, as displayed in Figure 12.  It should be noted, 
however, that with the exception of the sole enlisted operator utilized for the 
McInerney and Halyburton deployments, the Navy has required rated pilot 
officers to fly Fire Scout aboard ships.  Furthermore, unlike the UAV pilot NECs, 
note that the source ratings for being a Fire Scout AVO are limited to just AWR 
and AWS.  This imposes even greater limitations as to who can operate the air 
vehicle.  Given the success of enlisted fixed-wing UAV pilots, these requirements 
seem overly restrictive.   
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Figure 13.   NEC 8368:  MQ-8B Air Vehicle Operator (From Bureau of Naval 
Personnel)85 
C. U.S MARINE CORPS MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITIES 
(MOS) 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. Marine Corps has established a military occupational specialty 
(MOS) for UAV operators and currently employs enlisted soldiers to operate the 
RQ-7 Shadow.  Enlisted Marines between the ranks of Private to Master 
Gunnery Sergeant are authorized to be UAV operators, and Marines between the 
rank of Sergeant and Master Gunnery Sergeant are authorized to be External 
UAV operators, as displayed in Figures 14 and 15.  Enlisted Marines have been 
successfully operating UAVs since 1990, including the RQ-2 Pioneer, the SE-15 
Scan Eagle, and the RQ-7 Shadow.86   Enlisted Marines continue to operate the 
RQ-7 Shadow UAV to this day.   
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2. MOS for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Operator 
 
Figure 14.   MOS 7314:  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator (From Commandant 
of the Marine Corps)87 
                                            
87  Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Military Occupational Specialities (MOS) 
Marine Corps Manual. Washington , DC: Department of the Navy, 2008. 
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Figure 15.    MOS 7316:  External Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator (From 
Commandant of the Marine Corps)88 
D. U.S ARMY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITIES (MOS) 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. Army currently employs enlisted soldiers to operate the RQ-7 
Shadow.  The 2nd Battalion, 13th Aviation Regiment trains UAV operators for the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, as well as foreign military servicemen.89  The 
school just graduated student number ten thousand, and currently trains more 
than 2000 operators per year for the RQ-5 Hunter, RQ-7 Shadow, MQ-1B 
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Warrior, and the MQ-1C Grey Eagle.90  Before the Army cancelled their own Fire 
Scout program, all duties from piloting to maintenance were performed by 
enlisted personnel.91   
2. MOS for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator 
 
 
Figure 16.   MOS 15W:  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator (After U.S Army)92 
                                            
90 Ibid 
91  Michael Raymer. A Comparative Analysis of the Army MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and Navy MQ-8B Manpower & Training Requirements. Thesis, 
Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 33. 
92  U.S Army. "MOS 15W - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator." Army-Portal.com. 
http://www.army-portal.com/jobs/aviation/15w.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 
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E. U.S AIR FORCE  
1. Introduction 
The U.S. Air Force is the only service that has historically allowed only 
rated pilots to fly their UAVs.  They argue that their UAS are “more 
technologically and operationally sophisticated than other UAS, and a trained 
pilot is required to employ these UAS most effectively.”93  But even the Air Force 
is reconsidering this requirement.  A beta testing program began in 2009 at 
Holloman Air Force Base that began to train undergraduate pilots as well as non-
pilot UAV operators.94  The test program is aimed at non-pilot Air Force Captains 
who have four to six years of experience.95  The beta candidates will be 
screened for the same personality traits and physical requirements as traditional 
pilots, but some requirements will be less stringent, such as eyesight as physical 
dimensions. Part of the impetus for this paradigm shift is because the Air Force 
expects to train more drone pilots this year than fighter and bomber pilots 
combined.96   
2. Air Force Pilot Candidate Selection Method (PCSM) 
Since the Air Force still requires officers to fly their UAS, there is not an Air 
Force equivalent to the Navy NEC or Army and Marine Corps MOS description.  
Air Force pilots and UAV operators are selected by competing on a Pilot 
Selection Board based on the Pilot Candidate Selection Method (PCSM).97  The 
PCSM is an index that quantifies a pilot candidate’s aptitude for success at 
                                            
93  Jeremiah Gertler. U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems. CRS Report, Congressional Research 
Service, 2012, 25-27. 
94  Anna Mulrine. "UAV Pilots." Airforce-magazine.com. January 2009. http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/January%202009/0109UAV.aspx (accessed March 
1, 2012 ). 
95  CBS News. "Air Force Makes Push For Drone Operators." CBS New U.S. February 11, 
2009. http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-4540269.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 
96  Rachel Martin. "Drone Pilots: The Future of Aerial Warfare." npr. November 29, 2011. 
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/29/142858358/drone-pilots-the-future-of-aerial-warfare (accessed 
March 1, 2012). 
97  Military.com. "Become an AF UAV Operator." Military.com. October 13, 2008. 
http://www.military.com/military-report/become-an-af-uav-operator (accessed March 1, 2012). 
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Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT).  Factors contributing to a competitive PCSM 
score are displayed in Figure 17. 
 
PCSM takes into account several measurements associated with success 
 at UPT and combines them into one measurement. 
 - Previous flying hours (Experience) 
 - AFOQT Pilot Score (Knowledge) 
 - Test of Basic Aviation Skills (TBAS) Scores (Aptitude) 
The TBAS generates 9 measurements of pilot aptitude considering these 
 main areas 
 - Cognitive - Short Term Memory 
 - Psychomotor Scores - Hand/Eye Coordination 
Figure 17.   Pilot Candidate Selection Method (After U.S. Air Force)98 
                                            
98  U.S Air Force. "Pilot Candidate Selection Method." https://pcsm.aetc.af.mil/index.html 
(accessed March 1, 2012). 
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This research examined who should fly the Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and 
Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV)—whether it be rated pilots, 
commissioned Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), or Operations Specialist (OS) 
enlisted sailors.  The examination provided the costs and benefits associated 
with each type of Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) alternative. The cost comparison 
revealed significant lifecycle cost savings by allowing enlisted personnel to 
operate Fire Scout, vice continuing to have rated pilots fly Fire Scout.  Training 
costs were found to be reduced from millions for rated pilots to tens of thousands 
for enlisted AVOs, while amortized annual manning costs were cut by more than 
half, and overall cost savings were calculated to be on the order of billions of 
dollars over ten years.  The research also revealed both tangible and intangible 
benefits by allowing enlisted personnel to operate Fire Scout.  Tangible benefits 
included shortened length of training as well as reduced manning requirements, 
which are especially beneficial for small surface combatants with limited berthing 
such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  Intangible benefits included cultural, 
motivational, and proficiency issues that could be averted by allowing enlisted to 
be Fire Scout AVOs.  Additionally, a summary of knowledge, skills, and abilities 
(KSA) required by each service was provided for comparison.  The KSA 
comparison revealed that AVO requirements need not be as stringent as those of 
rated pilots.  In conclusion, the Navy should create a pilot program to train 
enlisted personnel to become Fire Scout AVOs.   
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B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions 
a. Who should operate the Fire Scout VTUAV—rated pilots, 
commissioned Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), or 
Operations Specialist (OS) enlisted personnel? 
Conclusion:  The framework has been laid and the precedence 
has been set for enlisted personnel to operate Fire Scout.  The Navy has already 
created a Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) for the MQ-8B Fire Scout–NEC 
8368: MC-8B Air Vehicle Operator (AVO).  Furthermore, enlisted personnel have 
already proven they can effectively operate UAVs—Navy enlisted personnel 
successfully operated the RQ-2B Pioneer and RQ-7B Shadow for over 20 years.  
The Army and Marine Corps are still utilizing enlisted operators for their UAVs to 
this this day.  The Army has already utilized enlisted personnel to operate Fire 
Scout, but that program ended with the termination of acquisition of the aircraft.  
Furthermore, the Army is currently producing thousands of enlisted UAV 
operators each year from their combined service training facility.  Although the 
Air Force as not yet allowed enlisted personnel to operate their UAVs, they have 
begun a program to train non-rated pilots to be UAV operators.  Indications are 
that enlisted personnel are poised and capable of operating Fire Scout.  Even 
senior officials in the Fire Scout program have indicated that enlisted personnel 
should be capable of operating this new generation of autonomous UAVs such 
as Fire Scout.  
Recommendation:   
• The U.S. Navy should create a pilot program that trains 
enlisted personnel to be Fire Scout AVOs.   
• Make the source ratings for NEC 8368 less restrictive.  Open 
up the source ratings to include non-aviation rates, such as 
Operations Specialists (OS). 
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b. What are the costs and benefits associated with each 
type of operator alternative? 
Conclusion:  The cost savings by allowing enlisted personnel to 
operate Fire Scout vice rated pilots are significant.  According to calculations 
utilizing the Human Resources Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT) and various other 
sources, the cost savings are on the order of hundreds of millions to billions of 
dollars over a ten-year period.  Training costs were reduced from millions for 
rated pilots to tens of thousands for non-pilot AVOs.  These calculations are on 
par with more extensive research conducted by an Air Force audit that 
determined $1.5 billion could be saved over a period of 6 years by allowing 
airmen to fly UAVs vice rated pilots.  The savings not only include vastly reduced 
training costs, but also lifecycle costs such as basic pay, specialty pay, retention 
bonuses, and retirement pay.  
The research determined that both tangible and intangible benefits 
exist by allowing enlisted personnel to operate Fire Scout vice rated pilots.  
Tangible benefits include greatly reduced length of training and reduced manning 
requirements aboard surface combatant ships.  Northrop Grumman Corporation 
(NGC) can train AVOs in a matter of weeks as compared to the years that are 
required to train a fully qualified military rated pilot.  By allowing enlisted 
personnel to be Fire Scout AVOs, manning requirements aboard ship are 
reduced by eliminating the need to bring additional rated pilots to operate Fire 
Scout.  This eases the burden of berthing-constrained ships such as the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) and Frigates.  This solution also provides for greater 
operational flexibility by allowing Fire Scout to operate from ships without an 
aviation detachment on board.  Non-pilot AVOs would also reduce the stringent 
medical and physiological requirements that are necessary for rated pilots.  This 
would create more qualified applicants that otherwise would not qualify for flight 
duty.  This would create a larger selection pool, which could reduce recruiting 
and retention issues.   
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Intangible benefits include averting culture and safety issues.  
Numerous studies indicate that rated pilots do not desire to fly UAVs and prefer 
to remain in manned aircraft.  The Air Force has been forced to offer enticements 
in order to fill UAV positions with rated pilots and has had issues with retention.  
Enlisted personnel, however, have demonstrated great pride and motivation 
conducting UAV operations.  Indications are that enlisted personnel will seek 
UAV operator positions if afforded the opportunity due to the job enrichment that 
UAV operations provide them.  Additionally, flight currency and proficiency suffer 
by forcing rated pilots out of the cockpit to be AVOs, which can create safety 
issues.  Proficiency and currency will lapse if rated pilots fly only Fire Scout, or 
they will be forced to reduce flight time due to time-sharing with multiple aircraft.  
By allowing enlisted personnel to be Fire Scout AVOs, rated pilots are able to 
stay in the cockpit and maintain proficiency in just one airframe.   
Recommendation:   
• The U.S. Navy should create a pilot program that trains 
enlisted personnel to be Fire Scout AVOs.   
• Allow rated pilots to remain focused solely on manned 
aircraft expertise in order to enhance safety by maximizing 
proficiency. 
2. Secondary Research Question 
a. What are the requisite Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities 
(KSAs) for a Fire Scout air vehicle operator (AVO)? 
Conclusion:  Determining the actual KSAs required to operate a 
UAV is well beyond the scope of this thesis.  The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and the U.S. military have been struggling with this issue for years.  UAV 
technology is relatively new and rapidly evolving, which has contributed to the 
difficulty in determining UAV-specific KSAs.  Some studies indicate that being a 
autonomous UAV operator is more similar to being an air traffic controller than a 
rated pilot and that the AVO essentially manages the air vehicle vice actually 
flying it.   
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Until UAV-specific KSAs have been identified and widely accepted, 
the U.S. military Navy Enlisted Classifications (NEC) and Military Occupational 
Specialties (MOS) for UAVs will need to suffice.  The Navy has created multiple 
NECs and the Marine Corps and Army have developed numerous MOSs relating 
to UAV operations.  The Air Force is the only service that has not created 
enlisted job descriptions relating to UAV operations, but relies on their rated pilot 
selection method instead.   
Recommendation:   
• The U.S. Navy should continue work with other services and 
the civilian sector in order to fine tune KSAs specific to UAV 
operations.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND STUDY 
• Restricting source ratings to only aviation ratings is overly stringent 
and unnecessary.  Identify appropriate new source ratings for NEC 
8368: MQ-8B Air Vehicle Operator (AVO). 
• Restricting source ratings to only aviation ratings is overly stringent 
and unnecessary.  Identify appropriate new source ratings for NEC 
8367: MQ-8B Mission Payload Operator (MPO). 
• Identify appropriate new source ratings for NEC 8366:  MQ-8B 
Organizational Maintenance Technician.  Restricting source ratings 
to only aviation ratings is overly stringent and unnecessary. 
• The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), researchers, and the 
military are still struggling to identify KSAs specific to UAV 
operations.  Recommend dedicated research of the civilian and 
military sectors to determine KSAs specific to UAV operations.   
• Research and development for Fire Scout weapons systems has 
already begun.  Recommend policy review to determine if a 
commissioned officer is required to be in the operational chain of 
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APPENDIX A.  EXCERPTS FROM HRCAT USERS MANUAL 
According to the HRCAT Users Manual, the following descriptions are 
provided:99  
The model is corrected for amortization: 
Most pay and compensation elements that require amortization are 
amortized over the average career years of service. The Enlisted average 
years of service is 7.88 years and the Officer average years of service is 
10.48 years of service. The list below details the pay elements amortized 
in the manpower costing tool. 
1. Military Training (Accession) – amortized over average career length 
2. Military Training (Flight) – amortized over average career length 
3. Military Training (Pipeline) – amortized over 4 years 
4. Military Training (Pipeline) – amortized over average career length 
5. Military Recruiting – amortized over average career length. 
 
Officer accession cost calculations:  
Officer accession training costs for NROTC and OCS are taken from the 
FY04 NAVEDTRACOM Cost Factors Handbook. Naval Academy costs 
were obtained from the DOD Accession Policy Office.  For costing 
purposes, the USNA, NROTC and OCS costs were averaged 40/40/20 
with the USNA at 40%, NROTC at 40% and OCS at 20%. The model 
applies this weighted average to billets for Unrestricted Line Officers 
because they enter the Navy mainly from these sources and in these 
proportions. 
 
 Enlisted accession cost calculation:  
 
Enlisted accession training costs are calculated based upon the FY04 
NAVEDTRACOM Cost Factors Handbook. Initial boot camp and “A” 
school costs have been included in the calculation and all FY04 training 
costs have been adjusted 3% per year. 
 
 
Flight Training calculations: 
 
                                            
99 HRCAT Manpower Costing. "HRCAT Manpower Costing Tool User Manual Revision 8.1." 
August 31, 2007. http://hrcat.serco-na.com/PersonnelCostingToolManual.html (accessed 
February 2, 2011). 
 64 
Pipeline costs for pilots and naval flight officers are based on the FY04 
NAVEDTRACOM Cost Factors Manual. The model calculates this cost 
based on a weighted average for each aviation designator based on the 
proportion of jet, prop, and helo aviation officer billets in the Navy. Costs 
are amortized over the average career length–10 years. 
 
 Pipeline Training calculations:   
 
Officer pipeline training costs (initial training) are currently available for the 
Surface Warfare and Submarine communities. Costs for other officer 
communities will be implemented as they are determined. 
Pipeline costs are based on the FY04 NAVEDTRACOM Cost Factors 
Manual. The model calculates this cost based on cumulative course costs. 
Costs are applied based on the average YOS of course attendance and 
amortized over 4 years. 
 
Enlisted Training Calculations: 
 
Enlisted C-School training costs are applied by NEC and calculated based 
upon the FY04 NAVEDTRACOM Cost Factors Handbook. All FY04 
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